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[L.· A. No. 22069. In Bank. Sept. 25, 1952.] 
Estate of HELENE I. BLOCH. Deceased. SALLY GOIJD-
BERG, Respondent, v. JULIUS J. BLOCH, Appellant. 
[1] Wills-Holographic Wills-Requisites.-A holographic will 
must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator's 
hand (Prob. Code, § 53), and it must be executed with testa-
mentary intent. 
[2] Id.-Holographic Wills-Position of Signature.-Signature of 
testator in a holographic will need not be located at the end 
but may appear in another part of the document, provided 
he wrote his· name there with the intention of authenticating 
or executing the instrument as his will. 
[3] ld.-Holographic Wills-Position of Signature.-The fact that 
testator wrote his name on holographic instrument with intent 
to execute it as a will must appear on the face of the document 
itself, and parol evidence is not admissible to show that a 
signature found elsewhere than at the end is a signature of 
execution. 
[4] Id.-Holographic Wills-Position of Signature.-Where a 
decedent's signature is found only in the body of a document 
which is claimed to be a will, the court must determine from 
an inspection of the instrument's language, form and the rela-
tive position of its parts whether or not there is a positive and 
satisfactory inference that decedent's name was placed in that 
location with the intention of executing the instrument, and 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 179; Am.Jur., Wills, § 632 et seq. 
[2] See daUur., Wills, § 184; Am.Jur., Wills, § 647. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, § 186; (2] Wills, § 197(1); 
(3] Wills, §l97(2); [4-6] Wills, § 197(3). 
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if such an inference appears, the execution is considered 
proven. 
[5] ld. - Holographic Wills - Position of Signature. - A holo-
graphic testamentary instrument may be admitted to probate, 
although the testator wrote his name only in the beginning or 
at a place other than at the end, when it appears that the 
instrument is a completed declaration of decedent's desires. 
[6] ld.-Holographic Wills-Position of Signature.-Where holo-
graphic instrument discloses a testamentary intent and name 
of testatrix appears in body of instrument before list of bonds 
which she specifics belong solely to her and are to be distrib-
uted equally among several named individuals, and where she 
excludes her husband from sharing in this bequest, giving rea-
sons for doing so, and it appears that such document is a 
complete testamentary instrument, her name is to be regarded 
as having been written in the body of the instrument with 
authenticating intent, although she used her name to describe 
the property covered by the bequest as well as to authenticate 
the will. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County admitting a holographic will to probate. 
John Gee Clark, Judge. Affirmed. 
Frye & Yudelson and Collman E. Yudelson for Appellant. 
Samuel D. Robbins for Respondent. 
GIBSON, C. J.-This is an appeal from an order admitting 
to probate, as the will of Helene I. Bloch, a holographic instru-
ment which was found after her death in a safety deposit box 
held by her and her sister as joint tenants. The document, 
which appeared on two sides of an envelope, was dated and 
was written entirely in decedent's own hand. The portions 
of the writing which were admitted to probate are as follows :. 
"My executor shall be Sally Goldberg (sister) who shall em-
ploy counsel & pay expenses from estate to fight any action ' 
which may be taken by said husband Julius J Bloch 
8/24/48 
Bonds belonging solely to Helene I. Bloch 8000QQ , 
530000 
1330000 
*Language on the envelope by which decedent attempted to provide 
funds for care of her grave was denied probate, but the parties raise 
no question as to this part of the order. 
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111 case of my death these are to be distributed to the follow-
ing childrell for tlll'il' edw'ation (divided equally) 
Babette !1'reshmall 
Carolyn F'reshman 
Barbara Sue Freshman 
Gary Lee Goldberg 
Susan Linda Goldberg 
Judy Brown 
Stephen Brown 
Julius J Bloch shall not receive a dower right or be allowed 
to contest my wishes in any court in the United States. 
Julius J Block did not 
over [end of first side of envelope] 
prior 
give me any part of these monies Same was saved (before) 
my marriage and invested likewise. During my marriage 
Julius J Bloch did not contribute to my support-I paid my 
own expenses throughout our marriage Therefore he is not 
to receive one cent of my estate. During our marriage Julius 
J Block, husband, was such only in name. 'When he had funds 
or made profits he squandered all on his selfish desires gam-
bling-also throughout this marriage I continually aided finan-
cially his many adventures-all ending with losses Therefore 
I feel he does not participate." 
The writing stopped at the lower right-hand corner of the 
second side of the envelope, and there was insufficient room 
at that location for any further words of the same size and 
spacing as were employed elsewhere in the document. Some 
unused space was left above the writing on both sides of the I 
envelope. 
[1] A holographic will must be entirely written, dated, 
and signed by the hand of the testator (Prob. Code, § 53), and 
it must be executed with testamentary intent. (Estate of 
Golder, 31 Cal.2d 848, 850 [193 P.2d 465].) The language 
of the document involved here is plainly dispositive in char-
acter, and the document was dated and was admittedly written 
by the hand of the decedent. The sole question is whether 
the decedent's name, which appears only in the body of the 
instrument, constitutes a signature within the meaning of the 
statute. 
[2] It is settled in California that the signature need not 
be located at the end but may appear in another part of the 
document, provided the testator wrote his name there with 
the intention of authenticating or executing the instrument 
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as his will. (Estate of Kinney, 16 Ca1.2d 50, 53 [104 P.2d 
782] ; Estate of McMahon, 174 Cal. 423, 424 [163 P. 669, 
L.RA. 1917D 778] ; see Estate of Manchester, 174 Cal. 417, 
421 [163 P. 358, Ann.Cas. 1918B 227, L.RA. 1917D 
629].) [3] The required intention must appear on the face 
of the document itself, and parol evidence is not admissible 
to show that a signature found elsewhere than at the end is 
a signature of execution. (Estate of Hurley, 178 Cal. 713, 
714-715 [174 P. 669] ; see Estate of Morgan, 200 Cal. 400, 
401-402 [253 P. 702] ; Estate of McMahon, 174 Cal. 423, 424 
[163 P. 669, L.RA. 1917D 629] ; Estate of Manchester, 174 ' 
Cal. 417, 421-422 [163 P. 358, Ann. Cas. 1918B 227, L.R.A. 
1917D 629] ; Estate of Kinney, 16 Cal.2d 50, 53 [104 P.2d , 
782].) The rule of evidence adopted in these cases has also 
been applied in determining whether a signature appearing 
in the body of a document is sufficient to satisfy the statute of 
frauds. (Marks v. Walter G. McCarty Corp., 33 Cal.2d 814, 
820-821 [205 P.2d 1025] ; 'McNear v. Petroleum Export Corp., . 
208 Cal. 162, 167-168 [280 P. 684] [citing probate cases].) 
[4] It has been said that where a decedent's signature 
is found only in the body of a document which is claimed to 
be a will, the court must determine from an inspection of the 
instrument's language, form and the relative position of its 
parts whether or not there is a positive and satisfactory in-
ference that the decedent's name was placed in that location 
with the intention of executing the instrument, and if such 
an inference appears, the execution is considered proven. (See 
Estate of Kinney, 16 CaI.2d 50, 53 [104 P.2d 782] ; Estate of 
Jlanchester, 174 Cal. 417, 421 [163 P. 358, Ann.Cas. 1918B 
227, L.RA. 1917D 629].) [5] Particularly important here 
are the principles set forth in the Kinney case where it 
was held that a holographic testamentary instrument may be 
admitted to probate, although the testator wrote his name 
only in the beginning, whenever it appears that the instru-
ment is a completed declaration of the decedent's desires. (16 
Ca1.2d at pp. 54-56.) The court said (16 Ca1.2d at pp. 55-56) : 
"Completeness alone has been held sufficient evidence of the 
adoption of the name so placed as the authenticating signature 
of the testator and as a compliance with the statute which 
requires the will to be 'signed' .... From the earliest con-
!'Iidcration of the question, completeness of the testamentary 
declaration has been deemed sufficient evidence of the 'signing' 
of the writing, even though the declarant's name was written 
by him at a place other than at the end." The court dis-
.) 
) 
574 ESTATE OF BLOCH [39 C.2d 
tinguished cases cited for the proposition that there must be 
some affirmative expression to the effect that the name was 
adopted as an executing signature, and it stated that those 
cases are not to be construed as holding that such an affirma-
tive expression is. required where the will appears to be a 
completed testamentary declaration. (16 Ca1.2d at p. 54.) In 
this connection it was noted that the decedents involved in 
those cases did not appear to have "done everything they 
intended to do." (16 Ca1.2d at p. 55.) The court, applying 
these principles, upheld a will which provided simply: "I 
Anna Leona Graves Kinney, do bequeath all my possessions to 
my four sisters who were living in 1923," giving the names 
and addresses of four persons. 
Many other cases, some of which have cited and followed 
Estate of Kinney, indicate that the courts of this state have 
been very liberal in sustaining the validity of holographic 
wills which appear to be complete testamentary documents 
although signed elsewhere than at the end. (See Estate of 
Brooks, 214 Cal. 138, 140-141 [4 P.2d 148] ["This is my 
will-Elizabeth Ryan Brooks," after which are numerous , 
specific bequests] ; Estate of Morgan, 200 Cal. 400, 402 [253 
P. 702]; Estate of Wallace, 100 Ca1.App.2d 237, 239 [~23 
P.2d 284], ["I, James T. Wallace have the use of all Personal 
and Real Estate as long as I survive," after which were two 
short sentences disposing of the property]; Estate of Gar-
dener, 84 Cal.App.2d 394, 396-397 [190 P.2d 629], ["I, Mrs. 
Estelle Gardener 433 West Laurel Street do give devise and 
bequeth Mrs. Dorothy Mathews and Mrs. Eleatra Hyatt" 
certain described property]; Estate of Kaminski, 45 Cal. 
App.2d 779, 781-782 [115 P.2d 21], ["Last will and testa-
ment of Belle Kaminski, Dec. 8-1937 ... being of sound 
and disposing mind and memory . . . do make publish and 
declare this my last will & testament in the manner following, 
that is to say," followed by specific provisions disposing of 
property and concluding with a direction for cremation]; 
Estate of Bauman, 114 Cal. App. 551, 553 et seq. f300 P. 62], 
["That I Lovina Bauman, on this date April 9th, 1929, desire 
my wishes herein executed as stated .... "J; Estate of Sulli-
van,94 Cal.App. 674, 677 [271 P. 753], ["I, Mark Cornelius 
Sullivan . . . revoking all wills by me heretofore made, do 
hereby publish and declare this my Last Will and Testament 
. . . in manner and form following: . . ."]; Estate. of Eng-
land, 85 Ca1.App. 486, 488 [259 P. 956], ["Last Will of Anna 
England," in caption, followed only by bequests].) 
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[6] The instrument involved in the present case, as we 
have seen, discloses a testamentary intent, and, in our opinion, 
constitutes a complete testamentary document under the fore-
going decisions. The writing, on its face, indicates that the 
testatrix did everything that she intended to do: She speci-
fied that the bonds which belonged solely to her were to 
be distributed equally among seven named individuals; she 
excluded her husband from sharing in this bequest, giving 
reasons for doing so; and she appointed her sister execu-
trix and directed her to resist any action which might be 
taken by the husband. The document, after giving the rea-
sons of the testatrix for exclusion of her husband, ends, in 
a natural manner, by stating: "Therefore I feel he does 
not participate.' '. The photostat of the instrument con-
tained in the clerk's transcript shows that after the word 
"participate" there is a mark which, although not entirely 
clear, may well have been intended as a period. Even if 
no period was placed at the end, other portions of the writ-
ing disclose that the testatrix occasionally omitted punctua-
tion marks after sentences and initials. (See Estate of Brooks, 
214 Cal. 138, 140 [4 P.2d 148], sustaining will with neither 
period nor signature at end.) The fact that the testatrix 
used her name in one part of the document for a dual pur-
pose, that is, to describe the property covered by the bequest 
as well as to authenticate the will, is immaterial. 
Unlike the writings involved in the cases relied upon by 
appellant, there is nothing in the document before us to 
suggest that it was incomplete in the sense that the testatrix 
may have intended to set forth any additional matter but 
failed to do so. For example, the instrument considered in 
Estate of :f,!anchester, 174 Cal. 417 [163 P. 358, Ann.Cas. 
1918B 227, L.R.A. 1917D 629], ended: "Whereunto I hereby 
set my hand this fourteenth day of January, 1914," and 
the court stated that these are apt words to precede a sig-
nature in attestation of a will and tend to show that the 
decedent intended to sign immediately below but did not 
carry out that intent. (174 Cal. at p. 419.) In Estate of 
*The parties, in their briefs, disagree as to whether the last word 
is "participate" or an abbreviation thereof or something else. The 
dispute is apparently due to the fact that the briefs contain photo· 
stats which are not as clear as the one in the clerk's transcript, which 
plainly shows each letter of the word. It is possible that the testatrix 
inserted the provision relating to her "executor" after she had written 
the above quoted sentence, but this does not seem to be material Bince 
each provision is complete by itself. 
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Bernat'd, 197 Cal. 36, 40-41 [239 P. 404], the court held that 
the abrupt termination of the instrument near the middle of 
the last page manifested that the writer did not intend to 
stop at that point but, rather, that something additional was 
to be done, and that this compelled the conclusion that the 
decedent had no intention of adopting the name written in 
the opening clause as the executing signature of a will. (See, 
also, Estate of Leonard, 1 Cal.2d 8, 9 et seq. [32 P.2d 603) ; 
Estate of Devlin, 198 Cal. 721, 726 [247 P. 577] ; Estate of 
Hurley, 178 Cal. 713, 715 [174 P. 669].) 
Since it appears that the holographic document written 
by Mrs. Bloch is a complete testamentary instrument, it fol-
lows, under the decision in Estate of Kinney, sttpra, 16 Cal. 
2d 50, 56, that her name is to be regarded as having been 
written in the body of the instrument with authenticating 
intent. 
The order is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
In my opinion the decedent did not comply with the re- . 
quirement of section 53 of the Probate Code that a holographic 
will must be "signed by the hand of the testator himself." 
Although this section does not require the signature to be 
affixed at the end of the instrument offered for probate 
(compare § 50(1)), it does require the name of the decedent, 
wherever placed, to be written with the intention of executing 
the instrument as a will. (Estate of llianchester, 174 Cal. 
417, 421 [163 P. 358, Ann.Cas. 1918B 227, L.R.A. 1917D 
629] ; see cases collected in 19 A.L.R.2d 926.) 
Regardless of where the name may appear in the instru-
ment, there is always the possibility, of course, that it was . 
intended as a signature. The mere existence of that possi- . 
bility, however, is not enough to permit a reasonable infer-
ence that it was so intended. When the name is used to 
identify the decedent as the author of the alleged will as 
in Estate of Kinney, 16 CaL2d 50 [104 P.2d 782] ("I Anna 
Leona Graves Kinney, do bequeath all my possessions to my 
four sisters")' or to identify the instrument as decedent's 
will as in Estate of Brooks, 214 Cal. 138 [4 P.2d 148] ("This 
is my will-Elizabeth Ryan Brooks"), and in addition the 
instrument appears to be a complete testamentary document, 
it may reasonably be inferred that the name was placed where 
) 
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it was with thc intention of cxecuting the instrument. In 
such cases the namc is linked to the alleged testamentary act 
and the probabilities that it was intended as a signature 
are strong. In the lUI'sent case, on the contrary, decedent's 
name appears only in the description of her property. It 
is not part of the description of the instrument itself or of 
the purpose for which it was written. The holding that under 
such circumstances the mere fact that the alleged will ap-
pears to be a complete testamentary instrument is evidence 
that it was signed, confuses the question whether it was in-
tended as a will with the question whether the name ap-
pearing thereon was intended as a signature. As this court 
pointed out in Marks v. Walter G. McOarty Oorp., 33 Cal. 
2d 814, 820 [205 P.2d 1025], quoting Chief Judge Cardozo 
in Mesibov, Glinert & Levy v. Oohen Bros. Mfg. 00.,245 N.Y. 
305, 311-312 [157 N.E. 148], " 'We may, indeed, infer from 
the delivery of the writing that the defendant intended to 
assume the obligation of a contract, whether the document 
was signed or unsigned. It might have intended as much 
if there had been no writing whatever. It may even have 
supposed that a writing was unnecessary. Something more 
must be found before the statutory requirements can be held 
to be obeyed. The defendant must have intended not merely 
to contract, but to sign. ,\Ve see no mark of such purpose.' " 
No inference was drawn in the Marks case that defendant's 
name was intended as a signature from the fact that it ap-
peared at the head of a complete instrument. Similarly, in 
this case the words "Bonds belonging solely to Helene B. 
Bloch" provide no evidence that decedent placed her name 
in the body of the instrument with the intent that it oper-
ate as an executing signature, and, accordingly, it is im-
material that the instrument may otherwise appear to be 
a complete testamentary act. 
"[T]he right to make testamentary disposition of property 
is not an inherent right or a right of citizenship, nor is 
it even a right granted by the constitution. It rests wholly 
upon the legislative will, and is derived entirely from the 
statutes. In conferring that right the legislature has seen 
fit to prescribe certain exactions and requirements looking 
to the execution and authentication of the instrument, and 
a compliance with thesc requirements becomes necessary to 
its exercise. " (In re Walker, 110 Cal. 387, 390 [42 P. 815, 
52 Am.St.Rep. 104, 30 L.R.A. 460].) It is the duty of a 
3l/ C.2d-li 
